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I. Introduction
Most Americans are now aware, and envious, of corporate Japan's
policy of lifetime employment. Even in times of recession, Japanese
employers have diligently retained their countrymen. They have re-
sisted, for example, the temptation to release the estimated nine per-
cent of excess manufacturing employees currently on the payroll.'
Americans are likely unaware of the motivation behind the lifetime
employment policy. Is the policy followed because it makes good busi-
ness sense, or simply because the Japanese population has come to
expect and rely upon it? Two recent events indicate that the latter
explanation is more accurate. The first event occurred in Japan, when
executives of the Pioneer company, facing severe profit shortfalls,
poised themselves to terminate thirty-five high-level employees. 2 Work-
ers complained to the press about their treatment after years of devo-
tion to the company.3 After government officials, top industrial
executives, and trade unions joined the discord, 4 Pioneer "clarified" its
earlier statements, and retreated.5 The second event began in Septem-
ber of 1990, when DCA, the American subsidiary of Japan's Dentsu
advertising agency, terminated twenty-two American employees, and
assigned their duties to employees ofJapanese national origin.6 These
terminations prompted the case of Goyette v. DCA Advertising, Inc.,7
which is the subject of this Note. When compared, these examples
suggest that the Japanese public expects, and is assured of, the protec-
tion of Japanese employees, while American employees generate less
concern, and consequently enjoy less protection.
Had the firing of American citizens occurred in Japan, some de-
I See Joseph Kahn, Downshiing in Japan; Carmaker Tries Bloody Reformation, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 8, 1993, at 1H.
2 Colin Nickerson, Japanese Business Struggles with Its Lfetime Job Ethic, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 14, 1993, at A].
3 Recession Strikes Japan's Lifetime Jobs, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 22, 1993, at Al.
4 See Nickerson, supra note 2.
5 See Recession Strikes Japan's Lifetime Jobs, supra note 3.
6 See Goyette v. DCA Advertising, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) and 830 F.
Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
7 id.
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gree of public concern may have developed. But when the firings took
place in New York, the Civil Rights Act was implicated. This Note -re-
views the United States District Court's application of the Civil Rights
Act to the national origin discrimination alleged in Goyette. Part II of
this note examines the court's analysis of parent and subsidiary liabil-
ity. In Part III, the background law relevant to the claims and defenses
of the parties is studied. Part IV contrasts the Goyette decision with pre-
cedent, identifying ongoing judicial difficulties, and issues of inconsis-
tency between Goyette and its predecessor cases. Finally, this Note
concludes that Goyette is a factually unusual case which, to a large ex-
tent, merely propagates past judicial misapprehensions.
II. Statement of the Case
This Note focuses upon two opinions issued in the same suit by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Together, the opinions detail the struggle of a Japanese advertising
company and its wholly-owned American subsidiary to escape the grasp
of American antidiscrimination law. Plaintiffs invoked the Civil Rights
Act of 19648 after they were terminated, allegedly without cause, and
their responsibilities were reassigned to employees of Japanese de-
scent. The first opinion considers the subsidiary's motion for summary
judgment, and includes extensive attention to both the facts and the
law. The latter opinion arose from the parent corporation's motion
for dismissal, which was converted into a summary judgment motion.
That opinion involves the parent company's attempt to disassociate it
self from the acts of its subsidiary and the claims of the discharged
American employees.
A. The Cast of Characters
The defendants in this case are prominent figures in the advertis-
ing industry. Dentsu, Inc. is the world's largest advertising and com-
munications company. 9 Dentsu is headquartered and does business in
Tokyo. 10 Its Japanese operations led it to serve a variety of prominent
Japanese companies with operations and sales in the United States.1'
To better serve its clients in the American market, Dentsu in 1983 en-
tered into a joint venture with Young & Rubicam, a prominent Ameri-
can advertising agency.' 2 The joint venture resulted in the creation of
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). Plaintiffs also pursued claims under New York State
human rights legislation. These claims will not be discussed in this Note.
9 Goyette v. DCA Advertising, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 737, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) [hereinafter
Goyette II].
10 Id.
1 See Goyette v. DCA Advertising, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 227, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Goyette I].
12 Id. at 229.
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DYR, an American corporation owned equally by the joint venturers.13
When this relationship ended in 1986, Dentsu became the sole owner
of the fledgling agency, which it renamed DCA.14 Dentsu capitalized
DCA with approximately $8 million and implanted ten Japanese
Dentsu executives in DCA's New York offices to monitor the subsidi-
ary's operations.1 5 Aside from its ownership of DCA, however, Dentsu
maintained few business contacts with the United States. 16
The plaintiffs were among twenty-two American employees fired
by DCA in September of 1990.17 The discharged employees repre-
sented slightly more than fifteen percent of DCA's total work force.,
The five plaintiffs also represented a wide range of advertising agency
hierarchy. At the top of the pyramid was Russell Goyette. Goyette was
hired in 1985 by DYR and quickly became vice president.1 9 When the
joint venture dissolved, a DYR client that opted to stay with Young &
Rubicam requested that Goyette become a Young & Rubicam em-
ployee and continue to service the client's account.20 DCA also had
aspirations for Goyette, however, and succeeded in retaining him.21 In
February of 1988, Goyette was promoted to the position of Vice Presi-
dent and Group Account Director at DCA. 22 In that position, he su-
pervised the accounts of many 'of DCA's Japanese clients. 2 3 Until his
termination in 1990, Goyette received annual salary increases. 2 4 Evi-
dence indicated that Goyette's accounts produced significant profits
for DCA. 25 Nonetheless, Goyette was fired in September of 1990, and
his accounts were divided between three Japanese Americans and one
"Dentsu expatriate." 26 Two of Goyette's successors were previously his
subordinates. 27 The evidence of Goyette's good performance pales,
however, in comparison to a stunning admission noted by the court.
When Goyette complained about his dismissal to DCA's President,
Toshio Naito, Naito responded, "'I'm sorry. We have to treat Ameri-
cans and Japanese differently. We have to favor the Japanese." 28
Plaintiff Bernice Gerstein's case further illustrates the discrimina-
tory nature of the DCA terminations. Gerstein was hired in 1987 as
13 Id. at 229.
14 1&
15 Goyette II, 830 F. Supp. 737, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
16 See id
17 Goyettel 828 F. Supp. at 229'. For the sake of brevity, the details of two plaintiffs' work
histories and terminations are omitted from this Note.
18 J&
19 Id
20 Jd.
21 Id. at 230.
22 Jd
23 l&
24 1d
25 Id. at 230 n.5.
26 Id. at 230.
27 1d
28 Id
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374 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 19
Media Group Head. 29 One year and two promotions later, she became
DCA's Vice President and Associate Media Director.30 Six months
before her termination, Gerstein received a performance evaluation of
4.5, which, on a scale of one to five, ranked her between "exceeds stan-
dards" and "exceptional."31 Though she was praised as "an incredibly
gifted writer" and received raises in May and July of 1990, she too was
fired in September.3 2 Like Goyette, Gerstein was informed that her
termination was not due to performance. 3s At the summary judgment
hearing, plaintiffs produced evidence that Gerstein was replaced by
Japanese expatriates who could not write a basic document in English,
and who were unable to serve their clients successfully in the United
States.3 4
The pervasive nature of the firings is demonstrated by the case of
Julius Filicia. Filicia was hired as an Assistant Art Director in May of
1989. 35 Six months before his termination, he received a performance
evaluation of 4.25.36 Nonetheless, he too was fired in September of
1990, along with the majority of his creative group.3 7 Again, Filicia was
assured that his termination was not based upon performance.3 8 The
performance of the two remaining Art Directors, on the other hand,
had been openly criticized by DCA supervisors.39 National back-
ground once again surfaced as a likely motivator, because two Art Di-
rectors were retained: one Japanese expatriate and one Japanese
American. 40 Evidence at the summary judgment hearing suggested
that employees at all levels of the agency hierarchy were subjected to
discriminatory terminations.
B. Round One: Plaintiffs' Claims for Relief Tested
1. Disparate Treatment
Plaintiffs presented a variety of legal theories to support their
claim for damages. Their first cause of action alleged intentional dis-
parate treatment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.41 In such a case, the court stated, the plaintiff must first estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination. 42 A prima facie case requires
29 Id. at 231.
30 Id
31 Id.
32 Id. at 232.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 231.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 232 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2 (1988)).
42 Id
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a showing "(1) that the plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) that
the plaintiff was qualified for the position; (3) that the plaintiff was
rejected from the position; and (4) that the discharge occurred in cir-
cumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination." 43 If the
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant, who must rebut with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory expla-
nation for its actions.4 4 Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. 45
Defendants mustered only minor challenges to three of plaintiffs'
four prima facie elements. With little discussion, the court cited Mc-
Donald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation4 6 for the proposition that per-
sons of American national origin are protected from discrimination by
Title VII.47  Likewise, the court quickly accepted defendants' conces-
sion that plaintiffs were in fact fired.48 The issue of employee qualifica-
tion required little more deliberation by the court. Precedent
indicated that the plaintiff needed only show that he had the basic
skills necessary for performance of the job.49 Referring to each plain-
tiff's substantial history of favorable reviews and salary increases, the
court found ample evidence to preclude a grant of summary judgment
for defendants on the issue of employee capability.50 Plaintiffs evi-
dence easily withstood judicial scrutiny on the first three elements of
the discrimination claim, setting up a more difficult fight on the fourth
element.
Plaintiffs offered a barrage of evidence to prove defendants' dis-
criminatory intention. The court first noted defendants' admissions
that Japanese employees must be treated differently. 51 It then consid-
ered plaintiffs' indirect evidence of discrimination. 52 The indirect evi-
dence included testimony that the American employees were replaced
by Japanese employees with inferior performance records. 53 Plaintiffs
also offered evidence that Japanese employees of equal or lesser pro-
fessional stature than their American counterparts received higher pay
and more benefits. 54 For example, while cars, club memberships, and
other privileges were provided to Japanese expatriates holding posi-
tions below Senior Vice President, such perquisites were withheld from
43 Id. (citing Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 832 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1987)).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
47 Goyette I, 828 F. Supp. 227, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
48 Id at 233.
49 Id. (citing Owens v. New York City Hous. Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 431 (1991) (quoting Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1979))).
50 Id
51 I&
52 Id. at 234.
53 Id
54 Id.
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American employees.55 Even some business matters, such as the
agency's Friday afternoon meetings, were open to Japanese employees,
but off limits to Americans.56
In response to plaintiffs' evidence that their dismissals resulted
from impermissible discrimination, defendants offered alternative ex-
planations and justifications for their actions.57 Defendants responded
that their employees' statements had been misconstrued. 58 The court
relegated the interpretation of defendants' statements to the list of
jury duties. 59 Defendants also argued 'that plaintiffs were fired for
poor performance in the course of a company-wide personnel reduc-
tion.60 This argument, however, was met by plaintiffs' evidence of pos-
itive performance evaluations and the fiscal senselessness of replacing
the American employees with better paid, poorly performing Japanese
and Japanese American employees.61 In sum, the court determined
that plaintiffs had established a genuine factual issue as to whether
DCA's explanations were a pretext for discriminatory treatment. 6 .
2. Mixed Motives
Plaintiffs also preserved another theory for holding DCA liable.
Plaintiffs argued that even if DCA had valid financial reasons for termi-
nating employees, illegal discriminatory motives also contributed to
the agency's actions. 63 The court explained that in such "mixed mo-
tive" cases, the plaintiff shifts the burden of proof to the defendant by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that discriminatory intent
influenced the employer's decision. 64 The employer, in turn, must
show that it would have made the same decision notwithstanding dis-
criminatory intent.65 After setting forth these rules, the court agreed
with plaintiffs that the foregoing evidence raised material issues of fact
on the "mixed motive" claim.66
3. Disparate Impact
Plaintiffs next advanced a claim of disparate impact discrimina-
tion. A disparate impact claim arises when the employer uses a facially
neutral employment policy to produce discriminatory results. 67 Such
55 Id,
56 1&.
57 I& at 233.
58 Id. at 234.
59 Id.
61 d.
62 Id. at 235.
63 1&
64 Id.
65 J&
66 Id
67 Id. (citing Griggs v..Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
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policies survive judicial review only if they significantly promote legiti-
mate employment purposes, and the plaintiff fails to suggest a policy to
accomplish the same goals without the discriminatory effect.68 In this
case, plaintiffs attacked defendants' policy of reassigning, rather than
firing, poorly performing Dentsu employees.69 Plaintiffs based their
allegation of discriminatory effect upon the fact that the protected
Dentsu employees were Japanese, while the unprotected DCA employ-
ees were American. 70 Plaintiffs argued that the facially neutral policy
of favoring Dentsu employees actually discriminated against
Americans. 71
The court determined that plaintiffs' discriminatory impact claim
faltered on the issue of proof. Plaintiffs submitted statistical evidence
which suggested that the Japanese Dentsu employees enjoyed unjustifi-
able favor. 72 After conceding that discriminatory impact is generally
proven most effectively by statistical evidence, the court stated that
such evidence is inappropriate when national origin and citizenship
are empirically indistinguishable.7 3 It then noted that Title VII does
not proscribe discrimination based upon citizenship, 74 and explained
that "if a company favors Japanese citizens over non-Japanese citizens,
statistical studies that indicate that the company is discriminating
based on national origin can also be explained by the company's citi-
zenship policies." 75 Statistical evidence is thus unreliable and is pro-
hibited due to its inability to distinguish between legal and illegal
motives.76 Because the Dentsu employees were ofJapanese origin and
citizenship, plaintiffs' only evidence, statistical data, was rendered use-
less, and the district court granted summary judgment for defendants
on the claim of disparate impact.77
4. The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
In response to plaintiffs' arguments, defendants claimed the pro-
tection of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (the
68 Id. at 235-36 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
69 Id. at 236.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 237.
73 The court stated:
[S]tatistical studies may not be used as evidence in all disparate impact cases. In
a case where a defendant claims that it is discriminating based on citizenship,
and the citizenship of the employees who the defendant is favoring is identical
to the national origin of those employees, statistical evidence is unhelpful. The
same statistics which purportedly show that the defendant is discriminating
based on national origin can be explained by the defendant's legal policy of
favoring persons of a particular citizenship.
Id. at 236.
74 Id. at 236 n.17 (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973)).
75 Id. at 236.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 237.
1.994]
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FCN), 78 entered into between the United States andJapan shortly after
World War IJ.79 Article VIII(1) of that treaty "allows 'companies of
either Party [to the treaty] ... to engage, within the territories of the
other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive person-
nel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice.' "80 Defend-
ants argued that this provision exempted them from the constraints of
Title VII and allowed them to discriminate based upon national
origin.81
Defendants were quickly shown that the FCN does not exempt
them from Title VII. Citing the Second Circuit's decision in Avigliano
v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.,82 the court stated that the FCN Treaty
merely sought to allow Japanese employers to hire non-American citi-
zens.83 The treaty was not intended to exempt Japanese employers
from other American laws. 84
Despite its refusal to fully exempt defendants from the provisions
of Title VII, the court did concede to defendants some benefits under
the FCN. The court cited the Second Circuit's Avigliano decision for
the proposition that Title VII must be interpreted inlight of the FCN
Treaty.85 When interpreted in light of the Treaty, Title VII allows Japa-
nese companies to discriminate based upon national origin if that fac-
tor is proven to be a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). 86
Such a finding would require a showing that the position requires "(1)
Japanese linguistic and cultural skills, (2) knowledge ofJapanese prod-
ucts, markets, customs, and business practices, (3) familiarity with ...
the parent enterprise in Japan, and (4) acceptability to those persons
with whom the company ... does business." 87 The court noted that
defendants had produced no evidence that these qualifications were
required of DCA's employees.88 Accordingly, the FCN defense
failed.89
78 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4 U.S.T.
2063 [hereinafter FCN].
79 See Goyette 1, 828 F. Supp. 227, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
80 FCN, supra note 78, art. VIII(1), 4 U.S.T. at 2070. See infra notes 128-170 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the FCN.
81 Goyette 1, 828 F. Supp. at 236-37.
82 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
The Second Circuit identified the name plaintiff as "Avigliano." The Supreme Court later
spelled the named "Avagliano."
83 Goyette 1, 828 F. Supp. at 237.
84 Id. at 237 n.21.
85 Id. at 237.
86 Id. (citing Avigliano v. Somitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982)).
87 Id. at 237.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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5. First Round Result: A Decision for Plaintiffs
By winning the dismissal of the disparate impact claim, DCA's
summary judgment motions limited, but failed to destroy, plaintiffs'
case. Although plaintiffs kept their claims alive, the court's discussion
of bona fide employment qualifications might have alerted defendants
to a plausible defense for trial.
C. Round Two: Dentsu Seeks Refuge in Japan
1. Long Arm, Broad Reach
Shortly after it heard DCA's summary judgment arguments, the
court considered Dentsu's liability under the Civil Rights Act. On a
second summary judgment motion, Dentsu first argued that it was not
subject to the jurisdiction of the New York District Court and was ex-
empt from the provisions of Title VII.90 Dentsu's motion for a Rule
12(b) (6) dismissal was accompanied by materials outside the plead-
ings, and was accordingly converted to a summary judgment motion.9 1
Dentsu unsuccessfully argued that the district court lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over the Japanese concern. Because plaintiffs' suit
arose under Title VII, which does not provide for national service of
process, the court turned to New York's long-arm statute on the initial
issue of personal jurisdiction.92 New York law grants personal jurisdic-
tion over foreign parent corporations whose subsidiaries provide serv-
ices "beyond 'mere solicitation,'" which the parent would undertake
for itself were the subsidiary not existent.93 The court determined that
DCA's services went well beyond mere solicitation, and that DCA ex-
isted to serve Dentsu's present Japanese clients and to generate addi-
tional contacts with the American subsidiaries of Japanese concerns. 94
The court then recognized Dentsu's status as the world's largest adver-
tising agency and the sole owner of DCA's stock.95 Finally, the court
considered the tight reins that Dentsu kept over DCA and determined
that, were DCA not in existence, Dentsu would find another means of
operation in New York. 96 Without further hesitation, the court
claimed jurisdiction over Dentsu. 9 7
Dentsu next denied that it fell within the Title VII definition of
"employer."98 The court responded by citing Spirt v. Teachers Insurance
90 Goyette II, 830 F. Supp 737, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
91 Id. at 741.
92 Id
93 Id. at 742 (citing Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir.
1967)).
94 Id. at 743.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 744.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 745.
19941
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& Annuity Ass'n 99 for the proposition that Tide VII defines "employer"
broadly enough "to encompass any party who significantly affects ac-
cess of any individual to employment opportunities, regardless of
whether that party may technically be described as an 'employer' of an
aggrieved individual as that term has generally been defined at com-
mon law." 100 Although Dentsu denied involvement in plaintiffs' termi-
nations, the court held that all of DCA's employees were affected by
the general labor policies imposed by the parent company. 01 Accord-
ingly, Dentsu was deemed plaintiffs' employer for the purposes of the
Civil Rights Act.
Along similar lines, Dentsu argued that it did not employ more
than fifteen people in the United States and was therefore not covered
by Title VII.10 2 The court responded-by citing Spirt and asserting that
Dentsu's control over DCA's firing practices justified Dentsu's liability
under the Civil Rights Act.103
Dentsu also claimed that it was not engaged in a trade that affects
commerce, as required for the application of Title VII.10 4 The court
restated precedent that "Title VII applies to foreign corporations to
the extent that they employ people and discriminate against them
within the United States."' 05 It then referred to Dentsu's $8 million
investment in DCA and the profits that Dentsu received from DCA for
proof that Denstu was engaged in an industry that affected commerce
for the purposes of Title VII.10 6 Again, Dentsu's argument failed.
2. The FCN Revisited
Finally, Dentsu asserted another defense based upon the FCN.10 7
The court once again explained that the Treaty does not provide Japa-
nese companies with an unlimited right to discriminate.10 8 Instead,
the court reiterated, discriminating Japanese companies shoulder the
burden of proving that national origin constitutes a bona fide employ-
ment qualification. 109 As before, however, the court noted defend-
ants' failure to produce evidence on that issue. 1 0
99 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982) (further citations omitted).
100 Goyette 11, 830 F. Supp. at 744.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 745 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2 (1988)). In fact, Dentsu had no American em-
ployees, when judged by common law standards. Id. For the purposes of the Civil Rights Act,
though, the court found the common law definition inapposite. Id.
103 I1&
104 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1988)).
105 Id. (citing EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 743 F. Supp. 856, 858 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd on
other grounds, 939 F.2d 920 (11th Cir. 1991); Ward v. W & H Voortman, Ltd.. 685 F. Supp.
231, 232 (M.D. Ala. 1988)).
106 Id. at 746.
107 Id. at 749.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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3. Second Round Result: Dentsu Suffers Substantial Exposure
New York's broadly structured long-arm statute prevented Dentsu
from escaping the jurisdiction of the District Court. Likewise, broad
interpretations of Title VII and the FCN prevented Dentsu from escap-
ing the grip of the Civil Rights Act. Alongside its subsidiary, Dentsu
was rendered susceptible to significant civil liability.
III. Background Law
The pertinent portions of Title VII are as follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which Would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affecthis status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin....
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and em-
ploy employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessa to the nor-
mal operation of that particular'business or enterprise. 171
The groundwork for plaintiffs' case was laid by the Supreme Court
in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation.12 McDonald involved a
claim of racial discrimination by two employees who were fired after
being charged with stealing sixty one-gallon cans of antifreeze. 31 3 The
plaintiff alleged discrimination because an alleged black co-conspira-
tor, also charged in the theft, was not fired.114 The Court first drew
upon dicta in Griggs v. Duke Power Co."15 indicating that Title VII pro-
hibits "'[d] iscriminatory preference for any [racial] group, minority or
majority."'1 6 It then noted legislative testimony that Title VII "was in-
tended to 'cover all white men and white women and all Ameri-
cans." ' 117 Finally, the Court held that "Title VII prohibits racial
discrimination against the white petitioners in this case, upon the same
standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and [the co-con-
spirator] white."' l8
I 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (e) (1988).
112 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
113 Id. at 276.
114 Id.
115 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
116 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation, 427 U.S. 273, 279 (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
117 Id. at 280 (quoting 110 CONG. Rac. 2,578 (remarks of Rep. Celler)).
118 Id.
1994]
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Also of relevance to Goyette is Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.I 9 Cecilia
Espinoza, a Mexican citizen and American resident alien, initiated the
case after being denied employment by the defendant, which had a
policy of not employing aliens.1 20 Espinoza claimed the defendant
had in fact discriminated against her due to her national origin.
1 21
The Supreme Court first noted the plain language distinction between
"citizenship" and "national origin," the latter of which "on its face re-
fers to the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the
country from which his or her ancestors came." 122 The Court then
found support for the distinction in the legislative history of Title
VII. 1 2 3 Having resolved that issue, the Court conceded that prohibi-
tions against hiring aliens may mask or produce discrimination based
upon national origin.1 24 "Certainly," the Court held, "Tit[le] VII pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship whenever it has the
purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin." 125
Ms. Espinoza, however, was unable to prove unlawful discriminatory
intent or effect because ninety-six percent of Farah's work force con-
sisted of American citizens of Mexican ancestry.12 6 Standing alone,
discrimination based upon national citizenship was deemed permissi-
ble under Title VII. 1 2 7
The other major legal document considered by the Goyette court
was the FCN. 128 Article VIII(l) of the treaty states:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage,
within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other techni-
cal experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other special-
ists of their choice. Moreover, such nationals and companies shall be
permitted to engage accountants and other technical experts regard-
less of the extent to which they may have qualified for the practice of a
profession within the territories of the other Party.' 29
Since its adoption in 1952, however, the forceful plain language of the
treaty has been largely judicially curtailed.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the FCN in Avig-
119 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
120 Id. at 87.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 88.
123 Id. at 88-89.
The only direct definition of 'national origin' is the following remark made on
the floor of the House of Representatives by Chairman Roosevelt, Chairman of
the House Subcommittee which reported the bill: 'It means the country from
which you or your forbearers came.... You may come from Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, England, France, or any other country.'
Id. (citations omitted).
124 Id. at 92.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 93.
127 Id. at 95-96.
128 FCN, supra note 78, art. VIII(I), 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
129 Id.
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liano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.I30 In Avigliano, a group of female
secretarial employees claimed that their employer, an American-incor-
porated Japanese subsidiary, violated Title VII by hiring only male Jap-
anese employees for management-level positions.131 The district court
had held that Sumitomo, as an American corporation, was not pro-
tected by the FCN.' 32 The court of appeals disagreed, arguing that "[i]t
is unlikely that the parties to the Treaty would have agreed to grant
each other broad rights to establish and manage subsidiaries abroad in
[one article], and then gone on to bar those same subsidiaries from
invoking almost all of the substantive provisions which the Treaty con-
tains."133 Nonetheless, the court proceeded to hold that Article VIII of
the FCN does not authorize Japanese companies to violate American
laws.' 34 The court determined that the language of Article VIII was
merely intended to override local laws that prohibited the employment
of noncitizens. 13 5 The court decided that the FCN does, however, jus-
tify a more expansive interpretation of the bona fide occupational
qualification exception to the Civil Rights Act.13 6 If the Japanese com-
pany can prove that the job requires an understanding of Japanese
culture, language, and business practices, the BFOQ exception may be
met.'3 7 The court of appeals remanded the case for an examination of
the defendant's BFOQ evidence.' 38
The Supreme Court interpreted the FCN differently.' 3 9 It held
that Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., by virtue of its incorporation in
New York, was an American corporation.1 40 As such, it was not entitled
to the protection afforded by the FCN to Japanese companies merely
operating in the United States.' 4 ' Prominent in the Court's conclu-
sion were representations by the governments of Japan and the United
States that Article VIII does not apply to companies incorporated in
the United States, even if the companies are wholly owned by Japanese
companies. 142 The Court discerned that the FCN's corporate provi-
sions were intended to "give corporations of each signatory legal status
in the territory of the other party, and to allow them to conduct busi-
ness in the other country on a comparable basis with domestic
firms." 143 An explicit grant of legal status was necessary because corpo-
130 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rwo'd and remanded, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
131 Id. at 553.
132 Id. at 555.
133 Id. at 556.
134 Id. at 559.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
140 Id. at 182.
141 Id. at 183.
142 Id. at 183-84.
143 Id. at 185-86.
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rations lacked a legal existence outside of their creator's sover-
eignty. 144 The Court concluded that the defendants' employer was an
American corporation and thus was not protected by Article VIII of the,
FCN. 145 Finally, the Court expressly refused to decide whether, as the
Second Circuit found, Japanese citizenship may constitute a bona fide
occupational qualification. 146
The Supreme Court's Avagliano opinion also produced conflicting
statements and inferences regarding the practical effect of the FCN.
The Court stated that "[t]he purpose of the treaty was not to give for-
eign corporations greater rights than domestic companies, but instead
to assure them the right toconduct business on an equal basis without
suffering discrimination based on their alienage."1 47 According to the
Court, this was accomplished in twboWays: by granting Japanese corpo-
rations "national treatment," and by allowing them to incorporate sub-
sidiaries in the United States.' 48 The Court then distinguished
between the two methods, and as. noted above, found domestic incor-
porations outside the scope of Article VIII(1) protection. 149 It rejected
the Second Circuit's contention that an interpretation of the FCN that
distinguished between national treatment and domestic incorporation
would deny Japanese subsidiaries the substantial rights afforded by the,
FCN to unincorporated branches of Japanese companies.1 50 Instead,
the Court held, "[t]he only significant advantage branches may have
over subsidiaries. is that conferred by Article VIII(l)."'151 In sum, the
Court interpreted the FCN to secure equal treatment for Japanese
companies. The most apparent means of achieving parity is by creat-
ing a representative American corporation. Yet companies that incor-
porate in America are conceded by the Court to lack an advantage that
unincorporated firms have: the benefit of Article VIII(1) of the FCN.
After Avagliano, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in MacNamara
144 Id. at 186.
145 Id. at 189.
146 Id. at 189 n.19. The Court added however, that, "there can be little doubt that some
positions in ajapanese controlled company doing business in the United States call for great
familiarity with not only the language of Japan, but also the culture, customs, and business
practices of that country." Id.
147 Id. at 187-88. The Court relegated to a footnote the FCN's own definition of "na-
tional treatment," specifically, "treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon
terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein,, in like situations" to domestic
companies. Id. at 188 n.18 (emphasis added). It then followed the Treaty's definition with
the assertion that "[i]n short, national treatment of corporations means equal treatment with
domestic corporations." Id. at 187-88. For contrasting evidence, see infra note 157.
148 Id. at 188.
149 Id at 189.
150 Id. at 189. The Second Circuit argued that if domestic incorporations were treated
differently from unincorporated branches, "a' crazy quilt pattern [of varying rights] would
emerge." Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd
and remanded on othergrounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). This reasoning, and the Second Circuit's
metaphor, was later adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Speiss v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
151 Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 189.
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v. Korean Air Lines,152 examined Korea's FCN Treaty, which included
provisions identical to the Japanese FCN. The Third Circuit deter-
mined that the FCN protects the foreign employers from citizenship-
based, but not national origin discrimination liability.' 53 The court
stated that the "literal meaning of a treaty's language should control
unless application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious
meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of
the signatories."154 After conceding, however, that the Treaty's terms
were "absolute and ostensibly self-defining," the court noted that
neither litigant had suggested that a literal interpretation of the Treaty
was appropriate. 155 Freed from the constraints of plain language, the
court proceeded to examine the purpose of. Korea's FCN.'.56. The
court noted expert testimony which indicated that the FCN provisions
were intended to ensure fair treatment to investors from both coun-
tries. 15 7 It then asserted that the negotiating countries had no reason
to bargain for the right to discriminate within each other's coun-
tries.158 The court further argued that the language of Article VIII(1)
reflected an understanding that only citizenship discrimination was
protected. 15 9 If the first sentence of Article VIII(l) was intended to
immunize foreign employers from domestic employment law, the
court reasoned, the second sentence of the provision would constitute
surplusage. 16° The MacNamara court thus found no support for the
assertion that the FCN authorized national origin discrimination.161
Goyette cites MacNamara for the latter's holding regarding the use
of statistics in disparate impact cases. After establishing that the FCN
protected citizenship discrimination, the MacNamara court noted that
in countries with homogeneous populations, citizenship and national
origin are statistically indistinguishable. 162 The use of statistical evi-
dence in such cases could therefore produce false indications of na-
tional origin discrimination against corporations permitted under the
FCN to discriminate based upon citizenship.' 63 To protect the force of
152 863 F.2d 1135, 1139 (3d Cir. 1988).
153 Id. at 1140-41.
154 Id. at 1143 (citations and punctuation omitted).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 ld. at 1142. The expert testified, "They aim, on ajoint and consensual basis, to estab-
lish or confirm in the potential host country a governmental policy of equity and hospitality
to the foreign investor." Id. at 1142-43. The same expert, Herman Walker, was also cited in
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), for the assertion that the
FCN also included "[a]bsolute rules [that] were intended to protect vital rights and privileges
of foreign nationals in any situation, whether or not a host government provided the same
rights to the indigenous population." Spiess, 643 F.2d at 360 (citations omitted).
158 MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1146.
162 Id at 1148.
163 Id. "Thus, unlike a disparate treatment case where liability cannot be imposed with-
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the Treaty, the court refused to impose liability solely on the basis of
statistical evidence. 164
Several cases not cited in Gayette are also relevant to an analysis of
the FCN dilemma. These cases reflect the efforts of other circuits to
reconcile FCN treaties with American antidiscrimination law. On one
hand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the FCN
fully insulates Japanese companies from American antidiscrimination
law. 165 On the other hand, the Third,166 Sixth, 167 and Seventh 168 Cir-
cuits have each decided that the FCN only protects the foreign em-
ployer from liability for citizenship-based discrimination. 69 However, all
of the latter circuits, like the Second Circuit, have rejected proof of
national origin discrimination, which could be explained alternatively
in terms of legitimate citizenship-based discrimination. 70
IV. Significance of the Case
Although Goyette reaches what seems to be an equitable and some-
what comfortable conclusion, its comparison with the background law
justifies some concern. Defendants arguably prevailed on some issues
in which they should not have. For example, defendants' escape from
plaintiffs' discriminatory impact cause of action was probably prema-
ture. Plaintiffs alleged that former Dentsu employees, in contrast to
DCA's American employees, were consistently reassigned rather than
being fired for poor performance.' 7' Though it is not apparent that
defendants made this argument, the court responded with
MacNamara's conclusion that statistics purportedly showing illegal na-
tional origin discrimination cannot be distinguished from legal citizen-
ship discrimination.1 72 Looking only to the statistical evidence for
proof of illegal discrimination, the court dismissed that claim.' 73 In
doing so, the court misread or misapplied Espinoza, which clearly pro-
out an affirmative finding that the-employer was not simply exercising its Article VIII(I)
right, a disparate impact case can result in liability where the employer did nothing more
than exercise that right." Id. (emphasis omitted).
164 1d&
165 See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982). Though Spiess uses the term "citizens," its reasoning seems to
cover national origin discrimination. Spiess has been interpreted by the Third Circuit to
"fully [insulate] the company from domestic anti-discrimination laws with respect to the hir-
ing of executives." MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1139 (3d Cir. 1988).
166 See MacNamara, 863 F.2d 1135.
167 See Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
168 See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
169 For an efficient and helpful examination of each of the circuits' interpretations, see
Scott Mozarsky, Note, Defining Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin Under Article V71I(l)
of the Friendship Treaty Between the United States and Japan, 15 FORDHAMI INT'L L.J., 1099, 1108-12
(1991-92).
170 See, e.g., Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393; MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
171 Goyette 1, 828 F. Supp. 227, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
172 Id.
173 Id at 237.
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hibits citizenship-based discrimination when used to mask or procure
national origin discrimination. The Goyette court-was obligated to look
beyond defendants' defense of citizenship discrimination, as the
Supreme Court did in Espinoza, to determine whether defendants' pol-
icy was a mere pretense for national origin discrimination. Ample evi-
dence of bad faith discrimination was before the court on other issues
to justify a denial of summary judgment, and to submit the issue to a
trier of fact with more time and inclination to learn the truth. Without
a doubt, the court's unqualified statement that "[i]t is well-settled that
Title VII permits discrimination based upon citizenship," 174 is decep-
tively simple.
The concept of citizenship discrimination also presents other
questions that are unresolved, if not confused, by the Goyette court. In
1973, the Supreme Court held in Espinoza175 that citizenship-based dis-
crimination was not in itself illegal. Nine years later in Avagliano,176
the Court expressly declined to consider whetherJapanese citizenship
may be a bona fide occupational qualification. If the discrimination is
truly based strictly upon citizenship, Espinoza would obviate the need
for a BFOQ exception. Only if the discrimination is actually a mask or
tool for national origin discrimination should the BFOQ analysis be
necessary to avoid the provisions of the Civil Rights Act.
The BFOQ paradox might be explained with reference to proce-
dural matters in Avagliano. The Avagliano plaintiffs, probably having
read Espinoza, claimed that Sumitomo was actually discriminating
based upon national origin rather than citizenship. 177 The district
court, citing Espinoza, decided that the defendant's policy resulted in
national origin discrimination. 178 That issue was not, however, certi-
fied for review to the appellate or Supreme Court. 179 As a result, the
Supreme Court did not reach the issue and was careful to classify the
case as one involving citizenship, rather than national origin, discrimi-
nation.180 Though the Court was apparently not interested in consid-
ering the Second Circuit's treatment of the BFOQ issue, it was also
reluctant to allow the Second Circuit's liberal interpretation of the Ti-
tle VII exclusion to become good law by default. The Court therefore
took the middle ground by noting, but neither approving nor re-
jecting, the Second Circuit's treatment of alleged national origin dis-
crimination with reference to the FCN. In any event, the Goyette court
was probably correct when it stated that a Japanese corporation can
174 Id. at 236 n.17.
175 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
176 Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 457 U.S. 176, 189 n.19 (1982).
177 See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 553 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
178 See Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 180 n.4.
179 Id. at 180.
180 See id. at 178.
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discriminate based upon national origin when origin is a BFOQ. 8 1
The question remaining unresolved is whether the FCN justifies a lib-
eral interpretation of the BFOQ exception to the Civil Rights Act.
The Goyette court may also have been incorrect in its discussion of
the beneficiaries of the FCN. The court cited the Second Circuit's
opinion in Avigliano for the proposition that "Article VIII of the FCN
Treaty does not exempt a Japanese company operating in the United
States, whether a parent or a subsidiary organization, from the reach of
Title VII."18 2 In doing so, the Goyette court ignored the Supreme
Court's implicit rejection of that proposition. The Supreme Court
held in Avagliano that subsidiaries incorporated in the United States
were American companies and were therefore not protected by the
FCN. 8 3 Yet the Court distinguished "national treatment" from domes-
tic incorporations.18 4 In fact, the Court asserted that unincorporated
branches ofJapanese companies would enjoy a right not shared by the
domestic corporations: the protection of FCN Article VIII. 18 5 In light
of Espinoza's holding that companies may discriminate based upon citi-
zenship, the only additional benefit that the unincorporated branches
could possibly enjoy would be the right to discriminate based upon
national origin. The Second Circuit's opinion on this issue is no
longer good law, and the Goyette court erred by relying on it in the face
of contrary Supreme Court precedent.
Goyette may also be seen as merely another propagator of some
very suspicious judicial precedent. American courts, particularly the
Second and Third Circuits, have demonstrated eagerness to avoid the
plain language of the FCN. As noted above, the Second Circuit in
Avigliano interpreted the treaty in light of business conditions at the
time of the treaty. The court concluded that although the FCN was
intended to facilitate the employment of foreign nationals, the main
obstacle to this goal was legislation restricting the employment of non-
citizens, not prohibitions against favoring persons on the basis of na-
tional origin.186 Though the court's understanding of the Treaty's his-
toric setting may be correct, that understanding does not necessarily
undercut the literal meaning of the FCN's provisions. Quite possibly,
the court was motivated by its own concern that a literal interpretation
of the Treaty "would immunize a party not only from Title VII but also,
from laws prohibiting employment of children, laws granting rights to
unions and employees, and the like."187
181 Goyette I, 828 F. Supp. 227, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). After all, a BFOQ exception is
included in the plain language of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) (1988).
182 Goyette I, 828 F. Supp. at 237.
183 Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 189. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
184 Avagliano, 457 U.S. at 188-89.
185 Id. at 189.
186 Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
187 Id. (citations omitted).
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The Third Circuit's analysis in MacNamara is less defensible. As
noted above, the MacNamara court first sought to avoid the plain lan-
guage of the Korean FCN by arguing that the parties had no reason to
bargain for a privilege to discriminate based upon national origin. 188
Yet the court recognized the parties' goal of reciprocal freedom to hire
their own countrymen.189 These two propositions are simply not mu-
tually inconsistent. Assuming, for example, that the primary goal of
the FCN was to facilitate economic cross-fertilization, this by no means
precludes a subsidiary objective of securing the freedom to hire based
upon national origin. 190 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit effectively de-
termined that the adoption of one objective precluded the concurrent
pursuit of a similar goal. Although MacNamara demonstrates unusual
and manipulative interpretation techniques, its conclusions are cur-
rently accepted as well-established by the courts of several districts.191
The MacNamara court's contrived adherence to signatory intent
also indicates a profound lack of confidence in the parties who negoti-
ated the treaty. Going into treaty negotiations with Korea, as in
MacNamara, the American diplomats must have been aware of the ho-
mogeneous nature of that society. And in the case of Japan, virtually
any American would have been aware that the Japanese citizens,
against whom the United States had just fought a World War, all bore
striking ethnic and cultural similarities. The assertion that the negotia-
tors did not consider this fact envisions a "sign along the dotted line,
and we'll both be home for dinner" approach to treaty making, which
is both sobering and hopefully unfounded.
Similarly unsatisfactory is the MacNamara court's second argument
in support of a limited interpretation of the FCN. The court's identifi-
cation of surplusage in the first and second sentences of FCN Article
VIII (1)192 can easily be explained with reference to the plain language.
The first sentence clearly pertains to the employment of executive per-
sonnel, or employees. The second sentence, on the other hand, relates to
the engagement of other professionals who typically would be in-
dependent contractors rather than employees per se. As the
MacNamara court notes, the language of the Treaty is clear and
unambiguous. 19 3
Despite the contrived nature of the various courts' reasoning, the
conclusion of an emasculated FCN is carried forward into, and
through, Goyette. At the heart of the controversy is the fact that the
188 MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1143 (3d Cir. 1988).
189 Id. at 1144.
19o See supra note 157.
191 See, e.g., Fortino v. Quasar, 950 F.2d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating unequivocally
and without citation that "[t ] he treaty permits discrimination on the basis of citizenship, not
of national origin").
192 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1143.
193 Id.
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FCN predated the Civil Rights Act. Courts were thus called upon to
determine whether the signatories, like the people of Japan, sought
the right to entrust their business to people who looked, sounded, and
generally seemed more like themselves, or whether they merely in-
tended to preserve the right to hire their neighbor, whatever his na-
tional background. In light of cases such as Goyette, the assertion that
the Japanese valued, and bargained for, the right to hire based upon
national origin does not seem unfounded. But in considering that is-
sue, courts have foreseen and avoided the consequence of foreign
companies enjoying greater rights than their American counter-
parts. 194 Goyette simply carries on this judicial tradition, though in a
more moderated fashion, by granting to defendants the aid of the Sec-
ond Circuit's liberalized BFOQ analysis.
The same concerns have arguably led most circuits to reject the
Second Circuit's BFOQ analysis. The BFOQ standards laid down by
the Second Circuit are more than liberal. Few Japanese employers
should have difficulty-showing that their employees need Japanese lin-
guistic and cultural skills, knowledge of Japanese products and busi-
ness practices, and familiarity with the parent company. Yet all of
these qualities might reasonably be expected of any American who has
earned a Master's Degree in Business Administration within the last
ten years. The remaining factor, acceptability to the Japanese clients,
may be viewed as catering to the prejudices of Japanese businessmen.
While realistic, this concept would likely be distasteful to the average
American, and the typical judge.
V. Conclusion
A. About the Law
Goyette v. DCA presents a jurisprudentially pleasing example of the
nation's laws responding to and meeting the changing needs of soci-
ety. As noted in the seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,1 9 5 the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended "to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities and [to] remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other em-
ployees." Through legislative and judicial renovation, the Civil Rights
Act has remained fresh and capable of protecting even the nation's
majority class.
194 The MacNamara court explained the dilemma:
If Article VIII (1) is read as protecting a foreign employer's right to employ its
own citizens, it is thereby guaranteed the same access to its own citizens as
domestic employers have to theirs. If it is interpreted to confer an immunity
from Title VII and the ADEA in connection with personnel decisions involving
citizens of the foreign company's country, it would give to foreign businesses a
right not possessed by domestic employers.
Id. at 1146. It was this result that the Supreme Court implicitly approved in Avagliano.
195 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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On the other hand, the civil rights victory in Goyette may easily be
attributed and limited to its factual situation, which was highly
favorable to plaintiffs. After learning its lesson in Goyette, Japanese
companies will certainly know better than to confess preferential treat-
ment for employees ofJapanese descent. As Ward Cleaver might point
out, this case should certainly teach the Japanese corporate community
a valuable lesson, which the community is unlikely to forget quickly.
Furthermore, the setting of the case, an advertising agency, is unique.
By its nature, success in advertising depends largely, if not primarily,
on knowing and communicating with the audience, not with the client.
Plaintiffs were selected and rewarded for their ability to sell Japanese
products to American consumers, not vice versa. Thus, defendants
had difficulty classifying plaintiffs' positions as jobs requiring intimate
knowledge ofJapanese business or culture. As a result, the chances of
meeting even the Second Circuit's liberalized BFOQ exception were
minimal in this case.
B. American Society Examined
What began as a study of Japanese culture, vis-a-vis the economic
community, may conclude as a study of American society, vis-a-vis its
judicial system. Though the words of the FCN are conceded by the
courts to be abundantly clear, few courts have been willing to honor
them.1 96 In fact, some litigants do not even dare to advocate a literal
interpretation.1 97 The decisions in cases involving the FCN suggest the
existence of a deep-seated repugnance to the concept of national ori-
gin discrimination.1 9 8 As a result of this sentiment, courts can barely
conceive of American diplomats bartering away freedom from national
origin discrimination in exchange for the right to do business in other
countries. Obviously, the courts reason, something else was intended,
but certainly not this. Arguably, Americans feel about national origin
discrimination the way that the Japanese feel about layoffs-it should
just never happen. Cases like Goyette, however, indicate that the Japa-
nese may have sought the freedom to discriminate based upon na-
tional origin. Accordingly, the FCN offered status "no less favorable
than" that enjoyed by domestic corporations.
Paradoxically, most courts are willing to reject allegations of more
covert national origin discrimination. When the defendant obscures
its intentions and asserts a defense of citizenship discrimination, courts
seem content to accept the defendant's contention out of respect for
196 One exception to the general rule is the Fifth Circuit decision in Spiess v. C. toh &
Co. (America), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
197 "Neither KAL nor MacNamara, however, suggest that a literal interpretation of the
provision is an appropriate one." MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1143.
198 It was this sentiment, certainly prevalent before 1964, that gave rise to the Civil Rights
Act.
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the FCN. 199 Perhaps defendant's "excuse" (assuming that a contrary
motivation exists, which is not always apparent) allows the court to re-
assure itself that the unthinkable is not really occurring. Nonetheless,
this blind-eyed approach to discrimination cases results in few victories
for the plaintiffs. Goyette, due to the remarkable candidness of the de-
fendants, and the unusual nature of the advertising business, was one
such victory.
BRANNON S. BURROUGHS
199 See, e.g., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1991).
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